We examine the role of incumbent firms in developing radical technologies, distinguishing between their motivation and ability to develop radical inventions. We argue that the motivation to pursue radical invention will be strongest when performance is moderately below aspiration, and will weaken as performance either falls substantially below aspiration or rises substantially above aspiration. At the same time, ability will increase with performance, resulting in a behavioral mismatch between ability and motivation-firms overinvest in radical invention when performance is moderately below aspiration and underinvest when performance is substantially above aspiration, with these effects being stronger for broad, multi-technology firms. We show empirical support for our arguments using patent data, using an empirical approach that distinguishes the potential radicalness of an invention from its eventual success. Our study highlights the role of established firms as a source of radical technologies, and examines the behavioral biases that may limit firms from pursuing competenceenhancing radical technologies.
INTRODUCTION
Radical technologies incorporate fundamentally new knowledge and represent a significant advance in performance, and their study is central to research on strategy and innovation (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Henderson, 1993) . Much of the prior work in this area has focused on the disruptive effects on incumbent firms of competence-destroying radical technologies introduced by new entrants (Chesbrough, 2001; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Kaplan & Henderson, 2005; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) , highlighting factors that either enable or constrain these incumbent firms in adapting to radical inventions by others, such as complementary assets (Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel & Hill, 2005; Sosa, 2009 Sosa, , 2011 Taylor & Helfat, 2009; Tripsas, 1997) , cognition (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan, 2008; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008) , and external stakeholders (Benner, 2007 (Benner, , 2010 ). Yet radical technologies may also be competenceenhancing (Tushman & Anderson, 1986) , with incumbents acquiring new competencies and recombining these with their existing knowledge (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Schumpeter, 1934; Van de Ven, 1986 ) in order to develop potentially radical technologies (Gatignon, Tushman, Smith, & Anderson, 2002) and thus transform their existing capabilities (Lavie, 2006) . Indeed, a growing body of work has shown that large, established firms play an important role in originating radical technologies (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Tripsas, 1997; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) , 1 developing breakthrough inventions (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Ghosh, Martin, Pennings, & Wezel, 2014; Jiang, 1 These studies also highlight that while incumbents are likely to pursue competence-enhancing technologies, not all radical technologies developed by incumbent firms will be competence-enhancing. Tan, & Thursby, 2010) , and introducing radical new products (Chandy & Tellis, 2000; Methe, Swaminathan, Mitchell, & Toyama, 1997) . Incumbents may have an incentive to pursue such technologies both to exploit their complementary knowledge resources (Eggers, 2014; Furr & Snow, 2014; Tripsas, 1997; Wu, Wan, & Levinthal, 2014) and to avoid losing out to new entrants (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Franco, Sarkar, Agarwal, & Echambadi, 2009; King & Tucci, 2002; Klepper & Simons, 2000) . Yet the questions of how, when, and why incumbents pursue competence-enhancing radical technologies remain underexplored. There is thus a need for more work examining the role of incumbents as a source of radical technologies, i.e., that focuses on the inventions incumbents develop rather than the innovations they successfully commercialize.
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In this study, we move beyond a focus on the entrant vs. incumbent dynamic to explore the heterogeneity in the development of radical technologies among incumbent firms. Specifically, we distinguish between incumbents' motivation to pursue radical technologies and their ability to successfully develop such technologies (Ahuja, Lampert, & Tandon, 2008; Henderson, 1993) . We explore motivation by building on prior work in the behavioral tradition studying the determinants of a firm's research and development (R&D) efforts (Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003 Greve, , 2007 O'Brien & David, 2014) to examine how a firm's prior performance relative to its aspirations influences its propensity to pursue radical technologies. We explore ability by building on the capability-based perspective (Helfat & Winter, 2011; Winter, 2003) to suggest that some firms have a persistent ability to successfully develop radical technologies. Our goal is to understand whether these two sets of factors support or contradict each other, i.e., do incumbent firms pursue radical invention when and where they are more likely to succeed, or is there a mismatch between their motivation and their ability?
Our main argument in the paper is that a firm's motivation to pursue radical invention will depend on its appetite for risk; specifically, drawing on behavioral theory (Cyert & March 1963; Greve, 2003) , we argue that a firm's motivation to pursue radical technologies in an existing technology area will be highest when its performance in that area is moderately below aspirations, prompting it to look for more novel solutions, but will decline as performance either falls substantially below aspirations (inducing threat-rigidity) or rises above aspirations (making the firm more risk-averse). At the same time, we contend that a firm's ability to successfully develop radical inventions in a technology area will depend upon its existing knowledge and capabilities in that areaconsistent with the idea that radical technologies developed by incumbent firms are likely to be competence-enhancing-so that firms with stronger past performance in a technology area will be better positioned to develop radical inventions in that area. As a result, we predict two important zones of mismatch between motivation and ability: firms whose performance in a technology area is moderately below aspirations are likely to overinvest in radical invention, while those whose performance is substantially above aspirations are likely to underinvest. Further, we predict that these tendencies may be exacerbated for firms operating in multiple technology areas. Not only will technologically diverse firms be more inclined to play it safe in high performing areas while taking greater risks in low performing areas, but these tendencies will be especially strong for firms whose overall performance is below aspirations.
We test these arguments in the population of U.S. patents granted to for-profit firms between 1980 and 1997, using a measure of the ex ante novelty of a patent's citations to assess its potential radicalness (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005; Schoenmakers & Duysters, 2010) . Consistent with our theory, we find that the likelihood of any given patent being potentially radical peaks when the firm's prior performance in that technology area is moderately below aspiration levels, decreasing as performance either rises above or falls below that range. These effects are stronger for more technologically diversified firms and for firms whose overall technological performance is below aspirations. Conditional on a patent being potentially radical, it receives a greater number of citations (and is more likely to represent a breakthrough), the stronger the firm's prior performance in that technology area. Overall, these results support a behavioral basis of a firm's motivation to pursue radical inventions, and imply a mismatch between this motivation and a firm's ability to develop radical technologies.
Our study contributes to and extends research on the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) and its implications for firm learning and search (Argote & Greve, 2007; Baum & Dahlin, 2007;  Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012; Greve, 1998 Greve, , 2003 Levinthal & March 1981 . While prior work in this tradition has generally focused on firms' motivation to take risks and engage in distant search, we argue and show that the same factors that motivate firms to search more broadly also impact their ability to undertake such search successfully, and that a mismatch between the drivers of motivation and those of ability may result in a systematic tendency for firms to under-and over-invest in riskier or more distant search. In addition, we move past prior research's focus on performance relative to aspirations at the firm level to emphasize performance at the level of the technology area, especially in multitechnology firms (Gambardella & Torrisi, 1998; Patel & Pavitt, 1997) , as well as the interaction between area-level and firm-level performance.
Our study also contributes to work on radical technologies more broadly. Moving beyond this literature's traditional focus on the (potentially disruptive) consequences for incumbents of competence-destroying technologies developed by entrants, we highlight instead the role of incumbents in developing radical inventions, arguing and showing that such inventions may be competence-enhancing in so far as the same knowledge and capabilities that made incumbents successful in the past may also help them succeed when pursuing radical inventions. We thus extend Henderson's (1993) landmark study, distinguishing between motivation and ability to pursue radical technologies (Ahuja et al., 2008) within incumbents, and showing that it is not that incumbents lack either the motivation or the ability to develop radical technologies, but that there is a mismatch between where they are most motivated and where they are most able.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Motivation to Pursue Radical Invention
We begin by considering a firm's motivation to pursue radical technologies. As mentioned above, the prior literature defines a technology as radical if it meets two criteria: it incorporates fundamentally new knowledge, and it represents a significant improvement in performance (Chandy & Tellis, 2000; Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Wu et al., 2014) . Of the two, the incorporation of fundamentally new knowledge is an ex ante choice, while the enhanced performance of the resulting invention is an ex post outcome. The choice to pursue radical technologies is thus the decision to undertake organizationally radical invention (Henderson, 1993) , i.e., to draw on knowledge sources that are fundamentally different from those used before, in the hope that these inventions will prove economically radical, i.e., they will substantially outperform existing technologies (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Gatignon et al., 2002; Henderson, 1993) . For established incumbents, such pursuit is likely to prioritize radical inventions that are competence-enhancing, i.e., those that build on their existing know-how (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) , recombining it with newly acquired competencies (Gatignon et al., 2002) to produce inventions that have the potential to substantially increase technological performance. Established firms are thus less likely to pursue radical technologies in entirely unfamiliar areas where their existing expertise is of little relevance (Danneels, 2007; Denrell & March, 2001; Sosa, 2009; Stuart & Podolny, 1996) , preferring to search for radical solutions in familiar technology areas, rather than look for radically new problems to solve (Levinthal, 1997) .
Our main contention is that when pursuing radical technologies in familiar areas, a firm's motivation will be determined in large part by its appetite for risk.
3 This is because the pursuit of radical invention is an inherently high risk strategy (Schumpeter, 1942) , with inventions that recombine fundamentally new and distant knowledge being less likely to succeed on average (Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004) but being among the most valuable when they do succeed (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Gatignon et al., 2002; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Katila & Ahuja, 2002) . Organizational research has long used behavioral theory to explore both risk preferences (e.g., March & Shapira, 1987) and the search behavior of organizations (e.g., Levinthal & March, 1981) . We therefore build on behavioral theory to argue that firms' motivation to pursue such risky strategies will be problem-driven, with firms undertaking riskier and more exploratory actions when their performance falls below their aspiration level (Bolton, 1993; Cyert & March, 1963; Dothan & Lavie, 2016; Greve, 2003) .
Specifically, we assume, consistent with prior literature, that a firm's aspirations emerge from comparisons with other similar firms and with the firm's own past performance (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Greve, 1998) , so that a firm performing "below aspirations" is being outcompeted by its competitors and performing below its own ex ante expectations. Moreover, given our focus on invention rather than innovation, we focus on technological aspirations and performance. 4 Where technological performance is below aspirations, a firm may perceive that its existing search routines and knowledge are no longer sufficient to produce the desired results, and may therefore look further afield for solutions (Cyert & March, 1963) . Performance below aspirations may also make a firm more willing to take risks (Bolton, 1993; Greve, 1998 Greve, , 2003 March & Shapira, 1987) , and therefore more willing to attempt radical invention (Fleming, 2001 ). While performance above aspirations leads to a focus on the prospect of loss, performance below aspirations is likely to drive managers to focus on the prospect of gain, increasing their willingness to take risks (Greve, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler & Johnson, 1990) . We thus expect firms to be more likely to pursue radical invention when their technological performance is below aspirations than when it is above aspirations.
Hypothesis 1a. Firms performing above aspirations in a technology area are less likely to pursue radical invention in that area compared with firms performing below aspirations.
Not only will firms performing above aspirations be less willing to pursue radical invention, but this tendency is likely to grow stronger as performance rises above aspirations. Firms performing above aspirations will fear a drop in performance should their attempts at radical invention fail (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Mitchell, 1989) , and cannibalization of their existing strengths should they succeed (Henderson, 1993; Reinganum, 1983) . Such firms are likely to satisfice (Winter, 2000) , believing that their existing routines and knowledge are sufficient, and seeing little incentive to explore more distant solutions (Denrell & March, 2001; Garud & Rappa, 1996; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) . A firm's risk appetite, and therefore its motivation to pursue radical inventions, is thus likely to fall as performance rises above aspirations.
Hypothesis 1b. The higher a firm's prior performance above aspirations in a technology area, the less likely the firm is to pursue radical invention in that area.
Turning to performance below aspirations, the prior literature offers somewhat more mixed predictions. Building off traditional behavioral theory (Cyert & March, 1963) , some studies argue that organizational risk-taking will increase as performance falls further and further below aspirations (Greve, 1998 (Greve, , 2003 Shimizu, 2007) . This would suggest that the pursuit of radical invention should increase with declining performance below aspirations. Other work, however, suggests that a firm's motivation to take risk may decrease as its performance declines below aspirations. Beyond a point, such underperformance may cause managerial focus to shift from adaptation to survival, and this may lead to threat-rigidity (Greve, 2011; March & Shapira, 1992; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981) . Thus, risk taking may be highest at performance levels moderately below aspirations, and may decline as performance falls further below aspirations to the point where managers see their very survival being threatened (Audia & Greve, 2006; Chen & Miller, 2007; Hu, Blettner, & Bettis, 2011; March & Shapira, 1992) .
While the predictions from the prior literature are thus somewhat ambiguous, we expect that the primary effect of performance decline below aspirations will be to lower the pursuit of radical invention. Our rationale is that while the pursuit of radical invention is certainly a form of risk-taking, it is not the only form of risk-taking that a firm can pursue. Recent studies suggest that as performance falls below aspirations firms become less likely to pursue actions that are highly resource-consuming (Audia & Greve, 2006; Kuusela, Keil, & Maula, 2017) or associated with high uncertainty (Dothan & Lavie, 2016) . The pursuit of radical invention is precisely such an action, since the outcome of such pursuit is highly uncertain, and likely to require substantial additional investment to realize value. As performance falls below aspirations, firms may thus choose to take risks in other ways-e.g., by investing heavily in more incremental technologies-while reducing their pursuit of radical inventions, as such pursuit may increasingly be seen as too risky. This is not to imply that the pursuit of radical invention necessarily starts to fall as soon as performance drops below aspirations. It may be that the effect of performance below aspirations is non-linear, with the pursuit of radical invention rising (or at least staying relatively high) as performance first falls below aspirations, and then eventually falling as performance drops far below aspirations (Iyer & Miller, 2008; March & Shapira, 1992; Ref & Shapira, 2017) . Our primary prediction is just that a firm's motivation to pursue radical invention will be lower when performance is far below aspirations than when it is just below aspirations. While we test for the possibility of a non-linear relationship between those two points empirically (as discussed in more detail below), we do not, for the sake of parsimony, hypothesize this relationship. Our overall prediction is thus:
Hypothesis 1c. The lower a firm's prior performance below aspirations in a technology area, the less likely the firm is to pursue radical invention in that area.
The first panel of Figure 1 shows the predicted relationship between a firm's performance in the relevant technology area relative to aspirations and the likelihood of it pursuing radical invention in that area, based on our discussion thus far.
Ability to Develop Radical Invention
A firm's chances of successfully developing an invention that has substantial impact are likely to be higher in areas of existing strength, i.e., technology areas where it has outperformed its peers in the past and where the firm's existing capabilities are likely to be strong. 5 Inventions that build on existing knowledge of deeper or higher quality are expected to be more valuable (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Jiang et al., 2010) , because they draw on stronger knowledge (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Nelson, 1982) and are more difficult to imitate (Helfat, 1994) . Moreover, firms that have outperformed their competition in the past will have strong internal routines and capabilities (Helfat & Winter, 2011; Winter, 2003) , with well-functioning teams of high capability individuals (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005) -capabilities that may serve them well in pursuing new inventions. In contrast, attempts to pursue novel technologies in areas where a firm's performance has lagged that of its competitors and/or its own past performance (i.e., a declining trajectory) are likely to meet with limited success, with the very factors that led to weak performance in the past continuing to plague the firm's future efforts.
We suggest that the argument above applies to a firm's ability to produce successful radical inventions. While it is true that radical inventions draw on fundamentally new knowledge and therefore represent a break from past trajectories (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Dosi, 1982; Laursen & Salter, 2006) , suggesting that path dependence may be a handicap in successfully pursuing such inventions (Henderson, 1993) , this does not mean that the knowledge needed to develop these inventions is entirely new. Rather, the logic (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Fleming, 2001; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Schilling & Green, 2011; Schumpeter, 1934; Van de Ven, 1986) suggests that path-breaking and valuable inventions result from the combination of new knowledge with existing knowledge (Jung & Lee, 2016; Nerkar, 2003) , and of distant knowledge with proximate knowledge (Capaldo, Lavie, & Petruzzelli, 2017; Dothan & Lavie, 2016) . In particular, successful radical inventions may require application-specific knowledge (Sosa, 2009 )-i.e., a thorough understanding of the domain in which the invention is to be appliedand this is likely to be strongest when a firm has exhibited strong performance in that domain in the past. Firms with strong performance in a technology area may have a better understanding of the relevant search space (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Jiang et al., 2010; Jung & Lee, 2016; Kaplan & Vakili, 2015) as well as superior absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002) , giving them a stronger ability to integrate new knowledge and sub-systems from other areas (Gatignon et al., 2002; Lavie, 2006; Zhou & Li, 2012; Zhou & Wu, 2010) . Thus, an existing firm looking to successfully develop a radical invention may be best able to do so 6 in a technology area where its past performance has been superior to that of its competitors, leveraging its strong knowledge of the application domain to recombine with new knowledge sources in order to develop a radical new technology. It is in this sense that radical inventions pursued by incumbents are likely to be competence-enhancing (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) , i.e., inventions that "substitute for older technologies, yet do not render obsolete skills required to master the old technologies" (Tushman & Anderson, 1986: 442) . As shown in the second panel of Figure 1 , we therefore expect firms' attempts to pursue radical invention to be most successful in technology areas where their prior performance has been strong (Taylor & Greve, 2006; Zhou & Li, 2012) . Thus: Hypothesis 2. The higher a firm's prior performance in a technology area, the higher the expected success of its potentially radical inventions in that area.
Together with Hypothesis 1a, Hypothesis 1b, and Hypothesis 1c, Hypothesis 2 implies a fundamental mismatch between a firm's ability to successfully develop radical technologies and its motivation to pursue such technologies. On the one hand, firms performing moderately below aspirations may be guilty of errors of commission, overinvesting in radical invention, because their performance below aspirations pushes them to be risk-seeking even though their ability to successfully develop radical technologies is relatively limited. On the other hand, firms performing substantially above aspirations may be guilty of errors of omission, underinvesting in radical invention despite their strong capabilities because their superior performance makes them highly risk-averse. Firms with technology performance substantially above aspirations may thus be subject to a competency trap (Levitt & March, 1988) or a core rigidity (Leonard-Barton, 1992) in their pursuit of radical invention. The third panel in Figure 1 shows this mismatch conceptually. It shows that for performance below aspirations, both motivation and ability are rising, but motivation rises faster than ability (because of the firm's increasing appetite for risk), creating potential for overinvestment. Conversely, for performance above aspirations, motivation falls with performance (because of the firm's increasing aversion to risk) while ability rises, leading to underinvestment.
Considering both motivation and ability in the same figure also allows us to consider the effect that expectations of outcomes may have on motivation. As mentioned above, a firm's motivation to pursue radical invention will also depend upon its ability to undertake such pursuit successfully; indeed, if a firm's choices were entirely rational we would expect motivation to follow ability, i.e., a firm would be more likely to pursue radical invention where and when it was more likely to succeed. Given the behavioral biases reflected in our first set of hypotheses we do not expect so strong a match between motivation and ability. We do, however, expect ability to ameliorate the effect of risk appetite on motivation. In particular, when performance is above aspirations, ability and risk appetite are likely to move in opposite directions, with ability rising as performance rises, but risk appetite falling, so that the effect of ability may be to weaken the effect of risk appetite. We thus expect the slope of the relationship between performance and motivation to be steeper below aspirations than above, a prediction represented in the final panel of Figure 1 , and which we explore empirically below.
Motivation in Multi-Technology Firms
Our discussion thus far has implicitly assumed that the firm operates in a single technology area, yet a substantial number of firms operate across multiple technologies (Breschi, Lissoni, & Malerba, 2003; Gambardella & Torrisi, 1998; Patel & Pavitt, 1997; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1994) , and this may impact a firm's propensity to pursue radical invention. Prior research has shown that resource allocation decisions in multi-business firms are often driven by non-strategic factors (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988) , and are subject to various behavioral biases (Arrfelt, Wiseman, & Hult, 2013; Bardolet, Fox, & Lovallo, 2011) , and similar issues may apply when managing a portfolio of technologies. In particular, we expect that technological diversity will accentuate the behavioral effects of performance above and below aspirations.
7 As technological diversity increases, fewer managers will have the breadth of knowledge to evaluate opportunities across all the different areas, and this will lead to corporate allocation decisions based on naïve diversification strategies (Bardolet et al., 2011) , standardized financial metrics (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988) , and measures of past performance rather than future potential (Arrfelt et al., 2013) . Such decisionmaking practices will increase the likelihood that firms performing above aspirations will choose not to pursue radical inventions. A manager in a firm that operated in a single technology area would have both more reason to be concerned about the threat of potentially disruptive radical invention by rivals, and a deeper understanding of the technology area that would make her willing to pursue exciting new technological developments. In contrast, a manager responsible for a diverse portfolio of technologies, many of which she knows relatively little about, is less likely to either foresee, or be concerned with, path-breaking new developments in any one area, and may be content to let well enough alone in technology areas that are performing above aspirations.
At the same time, a manager responsible for a diversified portfolio of technologies may also be more willing to take risks in areas where performance is below aspirations. Such a manager would be concerned with the risk of the overall technology portfolio rather than the risk of any one technology area, and may therefore be willing to take greater risks in any given technology area compared to a manager who only operated in that one area. Managers of technology portfolios may be especially inclined to pursue radical invention in areas that are performing below aspirations, both because they would want to raise the performance of these underperforming areas to match the rest of their portfolio, and because being part of a larger portfolio makes such pursuit less risky.
Together, these arguments suggest that the behavioral tendencies driving the pursuit of radical invention may be stronger for firms with greater technological diversity. Note that this is likely to be true even if the individual technology areas are managed separately (e.g., as separate units), rather than by a central manager. In such a case, competitive pressure between different areas (Williamson, 1970) will drive managers of areas performing below aspirations to take greater risks (Kacperczyk, Beckman, & Moliterno, 2015) and be more inventive (Gaba & Joseph, 2013) , while making those in high-performing areas more risk-averse (Arrfelt et al., 2013; Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1991 . For parsimony, we focus only on the main prediction-that radical invention is less likely to be pursued when technological performance is above aspirations (Hypothesis 1a)-in defining our formal hypothesis, though we empirically test the moderating effect of technological diversity on all three pursuit hypotheses. Our formal prediction is thus:
Hypothesis 3. The negative relation between a firm's performance below aspirations in a technology area and its likelihood of pursuing radical invention in that area will be stronger, the more technologically diversified the firm.
The pursuit of radical technologies in multitechnology firms will depend not only on the extent of a firm's technological diversification, but also on its relative performance as a whole. While prior research suggests that firms performing below aspirations overall may be more likely to take risks (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998 Greve, , 2003 , this effect may vary across technology areas. On the one hand, managers in firms performing below aspirations overall may be especially reluctant to pursue radical invention in areas of strong performance. A manager responsible for a technology portfolio facing strong pressure to raise performance may be especially loath to risk the few areas of existing high performance. And the manager of a technology area that is not only performing substantially better than its market competitors, but also better than other areas within the firm (relative to their competitors), may feel especially secure, and see no need to pursue radical technologies. On the other hand, managers in firms performing below aspirations overall may be especially likely to pursue radical invention in areas where performance is below aspirations. The manager of a technology portfolio who is under pressure to raise performance is very likely to take risks in areas that are performing below aspirations, and area managers in underperforming organizations are likely to have greater risk appetite in general. Overall firm performance may also influence behavior in the face of extreme performance. Thus, managers in extremely high performing organizations may be more willing to pursue slack-driven search, drawing on more distant knowledge to pursue potentially radical inventions in areas of existing strength (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Cyert & March, 1963; Nohria & Gulati, 1996) , while also being more tolerant of failure in underperforming technology areas (Staw, 1981; Whyte, 1986) , leading to less threat rigidity in these areas. Thus:
Hypothesis 4. The negative relation between a firm's performance below aspirations in a technology area and its likelihood of pursuing radical invention in that area will be stronger, when the firm's overall technological performance is below aspirations.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH
We test our theoretical arguments in a broad, crossfirm, and cross-industry sample of patents that includes all patents filed with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) by for-profit firms between 1980 and 1997 that were eventually granted, drawn from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001 ). While we recognize that not all inventions are, or can be, patented, patent data have been widely used to study both the patterns of firm search and the value of firm inventions (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Fleming, 2001; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Schoenmakers & Duysters, 2010) , and are therefore appropriate for our study of inventive pursuit and success. In particular, recognizing that most patents have limited impact, and that there is a strong correlation between R&D expense and patenting volume (Jaffe, 1989) , we use a firm's patents to measure the extent and direction of its inventive efforts (Eggers, 2012; Ghosh et al., 2014) and measure the success of those efforts by the citations its patents receive (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Fleming, 2001) as discussed in more detail below. In order to construct our variables (which require both backward and forward citation data), we focus on the years 1980-1997. We also limit our analyses to for-profit corporations (excluding government agencies, schools, and individuals). We supplement the patent data with financial data drawn from Compustat. In the analysis below, we show results both for all firms (785,490 usable patents from 16,455 firms) and for publiclytraded firms only (315,494 patents from 1,755 firms).
Constructing a Measure of Novelty
One challenge in testing our theory is the need to develop an ex ante measure of the radicalness of an invention, i.e., a measure that would allow us to identify potentially radical inventions in a way that is independent of their eventual success. Our approach to this problem is to separate out the two aspects that define a radical invention-the incorporation of fundamentally new knowledge, and a significant advance in performance-and to focus on the aspect that reflects a firm's ex ante choice. We are thus interested in identifying inventions that draw on knowledge that is fundamentally new to the field, and that therefore have the potential to be radical. Specifically, we identify potentially radical inventions as those that draw on knowledge that has never or rarely been used before by inventors in the same field, and that therefore represent "unprecedented combinations" (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Rodan & Galunic, 2004 )-the intuition being that when a firm draws on such novel knowledge it is trying to develop a radical technology. 8 To identify such inventions in patent data, we begin by comparing the citations made by the focal patent to the citations of other patents in the same technology space. For a citation made by a patent in technological class 9 i to a patent in class j, we take all other patents in class i in the prior five years (t-5 to t-1; results are robust to using a ten-year window) and calculate the percentage of their backward citations that were to class j. The notation is:
t525 citations ti Thus, a citation by a patent in class 128 (surgery) to a patent in class 219 (electric heating) in 1986 would return a LINK value of zero, since no patent in class 128 from 1981-1985 had cited a patent in class 219. Note that this LINK measure is at the citation level.
To assess how exploratory any given patent is we construct a measure called DISTANT, calculated as 1 minus the lowest (rarest) LINK score for all of the citations made by the focal patent. 10 We subtract the minimum LINK score from one to make the variable more readily interpretable as the pursuit of novelty. To account for differences in technological paradigms and opportunity, we normalize the DISTANT score by subtracting from it the average DISTANT score for all patents filed in the same technological class i in the prior year (t-1). Lower scores for DIS-TANT thus represent patents that draw on more local knowledge than the average patent in the technological class, while higher scores are for patents that draw on more distant knowledge.
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Our measure has similarities to several prior measures in the literature. First, our measure is similar to Fleming's (2001) measure of "component familiarity," except that Fleming's measure captures combinations that are new to the inventor, while our measure identifies combinations that are new to the field. Second, our measure is similar to Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe's (1997) measure of "originality," except that their measure focuses on the diversity of a patent's citations, while ours focuses on their novelty. Third, our measure is similar in spirit to one developed by Dahlin and Behrens (2005) , except that they measure novelty by comparing the pattern of citations at the patent level, while our measure of novelty is based on technology class level comparisons, making our measure both more sensitive to rare connections made by patents with otherwise conventional citation patterns, and less prone to bias from examiner-added citations (Alcácer & Gittelman, 2006) . Finally, Aharonson and Schilling (2016) develop a measure of "outlier patents" based on the co-occurrence of multiple classifications in the same patent, which is quite similar to ours; the main difference being that our measure focuses on citation links between the class of the citing patent and the class of the cited patent.
Dependent Variables and Radical Invention across the Sample
We use two patent-level variables as our main dependent variables (DV). In order to assess the pursuit of potentially radical inventions, we construct a dichotomous measure RADICAL, with RADICAL 5 1 where the DISTANT score of the patent is above the 90 th percentile in any given year, and zero otherwise. This measure thus captures whether the patent represents a potentially radical opportunity or not. We dichotomize this variable as opposed to using the continuous measure because our theory is not about why firms might draw on slightly more or less distant knowledge, but why they may draw on fundamentally new knowledge, meaning that we are only interested in patents at the highest end of the DISTANT spectrum. Results using the 85 th and 95 th percentile as the cut-off are consistent with those shown below.
Our primary measure of success, CITATIONS, is the (log-transformed) count of forward citations received by the patent. While we recognize that the correlation between citations received and economic value at the patent level is relatively weak (Gambardella, Harhoff, & Verspagen 2008; Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel 2003) , we believe that the use of citations as a measure of success is consistent with our focus on invention, besides being in line with prior research on the impact of patents (Fleming, 2001) . As an alternate DV we use a binary measure of whether a patent is a "breakthrough" (e.g., Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Kaplan & Vakili, 2015) , with BREAKTHROUGH equal to one if the patent's citations are in the highest 5% of all patents from the same class in the same year, and zero otherwise.
As our empirical approach described below focuses on patents from existing firms in categories in which they already have experience (consistent with our theory), 12 it is worth considering the distribution 10 We focus on the minimum instead of the average LINK score from among a given patent's citations because we are conceptually interested in whether the invention draws upon radically new knowledge, rather than the average familiarity of the knowledge used, and because the citation with the minimum LINK score is less likely to be examiner added (Alcácer & Gittelman, 2006) . 11 The data for this measure are available online at https:// sites.google.com/stern.nyu.edu/jpeggers/data. 12 Since our hypotheses require us to have measures for a firm's prior performance in a given technology class, we are unable to include either new firms (i.e., those with no prior patents) or the entry of existing firms into new technology classes in our main analyses below.
of both potentially radical inventions and our two measures of success between new and old firms, and between new and established technology classes within these firms. A basic descriptive analysis is shown in Table 1 .
The data in Table 1 demonstrate several interesting patterns. First, in line with prior work on competence-destroying technologies, we see that new firms tend to pursue radical invention at a higher rate (11.0%) than existing firms (10.2% for younger and 10.3% for older), with (unreported) univariate regressions confirming that this difference in rates is significant at conventional levels. These radical inventions by new firms perform relatively well, while those from young (years 2-5) firms perform the best in terms of both citations and breakthroughs. Table 1 also shows that the pursuit of radical invention is most frequent (accounting for 13.7% of all patents) among non-corporate entities (individuals, government agencies, and universities), though potentially radical patents by such entities tend to receive lower levels of citations.
Second, it is clear from Table 1 that established firms do pursue a substantial amount of radical invention; indeed, once you consider that established firms are by far the largest source of patents in our overall sample-accounting for nearly four times as many patents as new and young firms in total-it is clear that established firms account for the majority of potentially radical patents (about 60% of potentially radical patents across all sources, on a comparable basis). This is consistent with the idea that radical inventions may be competence-enhancing, and emphasizes the importance of examining established firms as a source of radical technologies.
Third, within firms with some experience (i.e., both young and old firms), Table 1 shows that not only are these firms more likely to patent in categories where they have prior experience (consistent with path dependence), but they are proportionately more likely to pursue radical invention in those categories, and receive more citations on average when they do so. Overall, Table 1 validates the importance of studying the pursuit of radical technologies in areas where firms have prior experience (columns three and five) as we do in our main analysis below, showing that these categories account for the lion's share of potentially radical patents.
Other Variables
Independent variables. Our main independent variable of interest is the firm's prior performance relative to aspirations in the new patent's technology domain. We construct this measure in two steps. First, we measure the firm's productivity in a patent class as the average number of citations received by the firm's patents that were filed in the previous year in the focal technological category ("nclass" in the NBER data). This becomes our measure of LOCAL PRODUCTIVITY t-1 that we use to assess the effect of firm technological performance on the success of radical inventions (Hypothesis 2).
13 Second, to measure aspirations, we following existing work in behavioral research (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003) and rely on a blend of social and historical aspirations. Social aspiration is measured as the average citations per patent received by all other patents (excluding the focal firm) in the technological class in the previous year. To measure historical aspiration, we follow prior literature (Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 1998 Greve, , 2003 and create a moving average measure of historical aspiration as a[Firm performance in t-1] 1 (1-a)[Firm aspiration at t-1], where firm performance is the firm's average citations per patent in the focal class. Following prior literature (Baum et al., 2005) , the results below set a 5 0.5, though results using alternate values of a are consistent. We selected the weight placed on social and historical aspirations through a grid search of all possible weights (at 1% increments), choosing the weighting that produced the best model fit (Greve, 2003) . This process showed that a weighting of 70% social aspirations and 30% historical aspirations fit the data best, though the results with other weighting schemes (including 100% social or 100% historical) are consistent. To calculate performance versus aspirations, we subtract the firm's category-specific aspirations level from its own measure of citations per patent in the prior year in that category. To examine the differential effects above and below aspirations, we follow prior work in behavioral theory and take a spline-based approach (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Baum et al., 2005; Greve, 1998 Greve, , 2003 , splitting performance versus aspirations into two parts: ABOVE ASPIRATIONS t-1 , which takes the value of zero if the firm is actually below aspirations and the value of aspirations-normalized productivity otherwise, and BELOW ASPIRATIONS t-1 , which takes the value of zero if the firm is actually above aspirations and the absolute value of aspirations-normalized productivity otherwise. When using this spline based approach we also include a dummy (ABOVE DUMMY t-1 ) which takes the value of 1 when the firm is above aspirations and zero otherwise (Baum et al., 2005; Kaul & Wu, 2016) in order to test our prediction (Hypothesis 1a) that the pursuit of radical invention will be less likely when performance is below aspirations.
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4 we rely on split sample comparisons between different types of firms in the data.
14 To capture a firm's technological diversity (Hypothesis 3) we create a patent based measure of CONCENTRATION t-1 , which is a Herfindahl measure based on the patent classes in which the firm patented, with higher levels representing firms that are concentrated in fewer classes. For firm-level technological performance (Hypothesis 4), we use a measure of the firm's general technological performance (FIRM PRODUCTIVITY t-1 ). The measure is calculated analogously to LOCAL PRODUCTIVITY described above, aggregated to the firm-year level, using the share of the firm's patents in each category as weights.
Control variables. We include the firm-level variables FIRM PRODUCTIVITY t-1 and CONCEN-TRATION t-1 noted above that we use for creating split samples as controls in our main analysis. To account for the possibility that firms may learn to develop radical technologies over time, we include a control for the firm's prior experience with the pursuit of radical inventions, measured as a decaying stock (using a simple 20% discount rate) of the number of times the firm has had at least one radical invention in each of the previous five years (EXPERIENCE t-1 ). We also include AGE t-1 , measured as the time since the first year that the firm appeared in the patent database (log-transformed), and SIZE t-1 , measured as the number of patents the firm filed for and later received in the previous year (logtransformed), as well as a dummy variable (ONE CLASS) to account for firms that only operate in a single patent class (and whose local and firm-level productivity are thus the same). Our remaining control variables are about the environment in which the firm finds itself, and include a measure of competition DENSITY t-1 (the number of other firms patenting in the same class) and two measures of growth (GROW PATENTS t-1 , which captures the year-toyear growth in the number of new patents in the class from t-2 to t-1, and GROW CITES t-1 , which captures a similar growth for forward citations). We also include dummies for each of the six technological categories noted in the NBER data (Hall et al., 2001) , as well as year dummies to capture macroeconomic and other related conditions For the subsample of public firms for which we have financial information, we include a control for INDUSTRY PROFITS t-1 , measured as the average firm return on assets for all firms in the same 3-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code in that year. We also include a measure of SALES t-1 (measured as firm sales in $2,000, log transformed), as well as a measure of the firm's financial performance (FIRM PROFIT t-1 , measured as the firm's return on assets). As discussed below, our main models also include firm-level random effects for pursuit models 15 and fixed effects for success models. Descriptive statistics and correlations are included in Table 2. While Table 2 shows some 14 We use a split sample approach-as opposed to interacting CONCENTRATION and ABOVE ASPIRA-TIONS (for example)-because all of our models are non-linear models, thus making interaction terms more difficult to evaluate (Hoetker, 2007) . Tests with interaction terms provide consistent results. 
Analytical Approach
Since we are interested in studying both a firm's pursuit of radical invention and the success of this effort, we adopt a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we test the hypotheses related to the pursuit of potentially radical opportunities, using a panel logit model with firm-level random effects to account for the binary nature of our dependent variable (RADICAL) while controlling for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. 16 Errors are clustered at the firm level. This first stage model includes all patents, potentially radical or otherwise.
In the second stage where the dependent variable is the log of patent-level forward citations (CITATIONS), we use ordinary least squares (OLS) with firm-level fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity, again clustering the standard errors at the firm level.
17 As these hypotheses deal only with patents where RADICAL 5 1 and our initial model clearly suggests that such pursuit is endogenous, we also include an Inverse Mills Ratio in the second stage to account for the selection into the potentially radical sample (Heckman, 1979 ) (generated through a probit model without firm random effects, but otherwise comparable to the first stage described above).
We use the growth rate of the patent's class (GROW PATENTS t-1 ) as the instrument in our first stage models. The logic for this instrument is that firms are more likely to pursue radical inventions in stagnating technology areas, so that the growth rate of the patent's class should have a negative effect on our first stage dependent variable RADICAL. However, the growth rate of a patent's class should not directly affect the extent of forward citations it receives, other things being equal. While patents in faster growing classes may have more future patents that could cite them (driving up forward citations), they would also have more current competing patents that could be cited (driving down forward citations), so that the growth of the class should not impact citations, except through the radicalness of the patent. Our empirical results support the validity of this instrument, which has a negative and significant effect in our first stage regressions (as predicted), and is uncorrelated with residuals from the second stage (not shown, but available upon request).
For our secondary measure of innovative success (BREAKTHROUGH), we use a probit model with firm fixed effects. One issue with this is that it may not fully control for selection because the use of firmlevel fixed effects and a Heckman selection control is potentially problematic in a non-linear model. Though there is some reason to think that the results should be consistent, given that both stages are probit models and there are sufficient numbers of observations per firm (Greene, 2003) , this potential concern is why we treat this model as a secondary test, and not our primary specification. Table 3 . Models 1 and 2 show the first-stage (logit) models for the pursuit of radical invention. Models 3-6 then examine the success of this pursuit, showing the second stage OLS for (logged) citations in Models 3 and 4 and the second stage probit for breakthrough inventions in Models 5 and 6, all within the sub-set of potentially radical patents. Of these, Models 1, 3, and 5 include the full sample of all firms patenting with the USPTO in our study period, while Models 2, 4, and 6 are limited to the sub-sample of public firms, for which we are able to include financial variables as controls.
RESULTS
Our main results appear in
In terms of the decision to pursue potentially radical opportunities, our theory suggested that firms moderately below aspirations would be most likely to pursue potentially radical opportunities, with the probability of pursuit being lower when performance was above aspirations (Hypothesis 1a), and falling as the firm's local performance increased versus aspirations (Hypothesis 1b) or decreased versus aspirations (Hypothesis 1c). We find consistent support for these predictions in both Model 1 (all patents) and Model 2 (patents from publicly-listed firms). In both models, the ABOVE DUMMY coefficient is negative and significant (p , 0.001) 16 The results of a Hausman test show that random effects models provide consistent results with fixed effects models, though we report fixed effects results as a robustness check below.
17 Results are robust to using a negative binomial count model, and to treating the second stage as independent (i.e., no selection). We use a fixed effects model in the second stage because a Hausman test suggested that the results of random effects were not consistent.
showing that there is a discontinuous decrease in the pursuit of potentially radical inventions as performance rises above aspirations, consistent with Hypothesis 1a. Further, the coefficient on ABOVE ASPIRATIONS is negative and significant (p , 0.001), consistent with Hypothesis 1b, and the coefficient on BELOW ASPIRATIONS is also negative and significant (p , 0.001), supporting Hypothesis 1c. As predicted, moreover, the slope of ABOVE ASPIRATIONS is significantly less negative than the Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
1 p , 0.10 *p , 0.05 **p , 0.01 ***p , 0.001 a Aspiration-normalized firm productivity used for Models 1 and 2, unadjusted productivity for Models 3-6.
slope on BELOW ASPIRATIONS (a Wald test shows the coefficients are different at p , 0.001). In terms of economic significance, we see (based on Model 1) that a patent from a firm whose local productivity is just below aspirations is 12.4% likely to be potentially radical, while patents at the 50 th percentile of BELOW ASPIRATIONS or ABOVE ASPIRATIONS have a probability of being potentially radical of 10.4% or 10.9%, respectively.
Turning to the success of potentially radical inventions, Models 3 and 4 (predicting CITATIONS) and Models 5 and 6 (predicting BREAKTHROUGH) are very consistent with one another. In every case, the coefficient on LOCAL PRODUCTIVITY is positive and significant (p , 0.001), suggesting that the technological performance of any given patent is an increasing function of the firm's recent performance in the same technological class. While the economic effect is relatively small given the variability in patent outcomes, the effect is still significant-moving from the 25 th percentile of LOCAL PRODUCTIVITY to the 75 th percentile increases the expected number of citations by 50%. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2.
Since the pursuit models are non-linear models and the success model (for CITATIONS) uses the log of citations, it makes sense to graph the results to get a sense of the match with expectations. Figure  2 shows the simulated results. 18 The consistency between the observed relationships in Figure 2 and the predicted relationships in Figure 1 supports our theory.
Split Sample Analyses
Having tested our hypotheses regarding both the pursuit and success of radical invention in our full sample, we now turn to split sample analyses to test our moderating hypotheses (Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4). These hypotheses predicted that the tendency for firms to pursue radical invention in areas where their technological performance was below aspirations would be stronger, the more technologically diverse the firm (Hypothesis 3) and the weaker the firm's overall technological performance (Hypothesis 4). More generally, we predicted Table 3 , Model 1 (pursuit) and Table 6 , Model 4 (citations) to plot pursuit and citations on the same X-axis. Similar graph can be created using Table 3 , Model 3 (citations), though this uses a secondary X-axis as well.
that the pattern of results in our pursuit regressions above would be stronger-i.e., the ABOVE DUMMY would be more negative, and the BELOW ASPIRATIONS and ABOVE ASPIRATIONS lines would be steeper-for technologically diverse and lagging firms. We test these predictions with the results in Table 4 . Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 show split-sample results for the first stage pursuit models based on median splits for CONCENTRATION into technologically focused and diversified firms respectively. Comparing Models 1 and 2 and using the seemingly unrelated estimation test created by Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou (1995) , we find that the slopes for ABOVE DUMMY (p , 0.001), BELOW ASPIRATIONS (p , 0.001), and ABOVE ASPIRATIONS (p , 0.001) are significantly different. Thus, the behavioral effects are stronger in more technologically diversified firms, supporting Hypothesis 3.
The second split sample analysis involves the firm's overall level of technological performance. We assess this by splitting our sample into high performing and low performing firms based on FIRM PRODUCTIVITY in Models 3 and 4 in Table 4 respectively. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, we find that the coefficient ABOVE DUMMY (p , 0.001) is more negative in low performing firms. We also find that the coefficient of BELOW ASPIRATIONS (p , 0.001) is significantly more negative for low performing firms, though the coefficient of ABOVE ASPIRATIONS is not significantly different across the two models. These results suggest that the behavioral pattern we predicted-of firms pursuing radical invention in technology classes where their performance is moderately below aspirations, while avoiding such pursuit in classes where their performance is either substantially below or substantially above aspirations-is stronger when the firm's overall technological performance is weak.
Alternate Explanations and Robustness
One alternate explanation for firms being less likely to pursue radical invention in areas where their prior performance has been strong is that firms may choose not to cannibalize their existing technologies in areas of existing strength (Henderson, 1993; Reinganum, 1983; Wu et al., 2014) . The decision not to pursue radical invention in areas of strength may thus be economically rational. While this would certainly explain why the likelihood of pursuing radical inventions falls as performance rises above aspirations, it does not explain why this likelihood also falls as performance drops below aspirations; firms should be even less concerned about cannibalization when performance is far below aspirations than when it is moderately below aspirations (Cabral, 2003) .
Nevertheless, we run a supplementary analysis to test the alternate explanation that the negative relationship between performance above aspirations and pursuit of radical invention is driven by cannibalization concerns. We do so by splitting our sample on firms' financial performance. If the negative effect of performance on radical pursuit is driven by cannibalization concerns, it should be stronger in more profitable firms, since the stronger a firm's existing financial performance, the greater the potential loss from cannibalization. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5 which shows the results of our first stage regression for firms with earnings before taxes (EBT) / Sales above and below industry average (Models 1 and 2, respectively) and Return on Assets (RoA) above and below industry average (Models 3 and 4, respectively). These models show no substantial difference in the effect of performance above aspirations between financially high and low performing firms, which is inconsistent with the cannibalization explanation. The models do show a significant difference in the slope of the BELOW ASPIRATIONS line, with this line being steeper for financially high performing firms, suggesting that such firms may be less likely to pursue radical invention as performance falls substantially below aspirations-a result that is the opposite of what we would expect if the slope were driven by cannibalization.
A second alternate explanation is that incumbents pursue radical inventions as real options, investing in risky and uncertain technologies so as to have the option of commercializing them should they prove successful (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; McGrath & Nerkar, 2004) . While this would certainly explain why firms are less likely to invest in such technologies as their technological performance exceeds that of their competitors (making success in those areas less uncertain), it does not explain why the motivation to pursue radical invention should fall as performance falls below aspirations. Further, prior work has shown that the pursuit of real options is less likely when the firm has pursued such options in the past, and more likely when the firm faces substantial competition (McGrath & Nerkar, 2004) , suggesting that if potentially radical inventions are being pursued as real options, such pursuit should decrease with prior experience, and increase with competition. But the results in Table 3 show the opposite, with EXPERIENCE taking a positive and significant coefficient, while DENSITY (our measure of competition in the technology area) takes a negative and significant coefficient. As a final check of the potential real options explanation, we follow Sakhartov and Folta (2013) and use our existing second stage models (e.g., Table 2 , Model 3) to produce an ex ante expected level of opportunity cost. This firmcategory-year-specific measure of opportunity cost assumes the best potential alternative for pursuing potentially radical invention is non-radical (incremental) invention. Specifically, we used the current second stage models to predict citations per patent based on the full set of firm-and categorylevel variables for both potentially radical patents and for "regular" patents. We then subtracted the predicted values for radical from the corresponding predicted values for non-radical, with higher values of the difference implying a higher opportunity cost of pursuing potentially radical invention. We averaged the value of this difference across all patents the firm had in the year and patent class, then lagged that average value by one year. This provided an expected OPPORTUNITY COST for the firm to consider when choosing to pursue potentially radical invention. We include this variable as a control in Model 1 of Table 6 . While the coefficient on OPPORTUNITY COST is negative, as predicted by real option logic, the inclusion of this variable does not materially affect our results. Overall, then, our results fit better with behavioral theory than with real options reasoning.
We include a few additional robustness checks in Table 6 . As discussed in our theory section, it is possible that performance below aspirations 19 has a non-linear effect on the pursuit of radical invention. We test for this possibility in Model 2, which includes non-linear terms for both ABOVE ASPIRATIONS and BELOW ASPIRATIONS. While we find statistically significant evidence of nonlinearities both above and below aspirations, the magnitude of non-linearity is extremely modest, and the shape below aspirations is not in the direction expected by March and Shapira (1992) , which would suggest a positive main effect and a negative squared term. While we cannot fully explain why we do not see the pattern of risk-taking first increasing and then decreasing as performance falls below aspirations observed in some other work (Ref & Shapira, 2017; Shimizu, 2007) , we suspect, as discussed earlier, that this may have to do with the nature of our outcome variable. The pursuit of radical invention is a highly risky and uncertain action, one that firms may therefore be less likely to pursue as performance falls further and further below aspirations (Dothan & Lavie, 2016) , preferring instead to pursue other, less uncertain forms of exploration. This effect may be exacerbated by declining ability: as performance falls below aspirations, firms may (correctly) perceive their chances of succeeding at such inventions as being too low to be worth pursuing, and may prefer to pursue less novel, though still highly risky, inventions.
To test the explanation that firms pursue less radical, though still risky, inventions as performance falls below aspirations, we undertake an ex post analysis (not reported, but available upon request) examining the likelihood of firms pursuing moderately novel inventions, i.e., those that fall within the 60 th and 90 th percentile on our DISTANT measure. We find that the pursuit of such moderately novel inventions increases at a decreasing rate as performance falls below aspirations, and that the likelihood of such pursuit is lowest when performance is just below aspirations (i.e., the coefficient of the ABOVE DUMMY is positive). The results of this ex post analysis for moderately novel inventions are thus the opposite of those for potentially radical inventions in our main analysis, consistent with the idea that firms are most likely to pursue potentially radical inventions when performance is just below aspirations, and switch to more moderate forms of exploration as performance falls further below that point.
Model 3 in Table 6 replicates our main results for pursuit, but uses firm-level fixed effects instead of random effects. 20 As we noted earlier, a Hausman test supported the use of random effects, but we wanted to include the fixed effects results as well to show robustness. The results are consistent with the random effects models that we report in the main body of the paper. In addition, given that we use a measure of local technological productivity to test Hypothesis 2 that is not adjusted by aspirations (as is consistent with our theory), but all of our other tests focus on aspirations-adjusted local technological performance, we wanted to ensure that our results were robust by using aspirations-adjusted performance to predict success. These results are shown in Models 4 and 5, and both are consistent with our original results.
Throughout the paper, we have noted a number of other robustness checks that we have performed to validate the consistency of our results. For the sake of brevity, these results are excluded from the paper, but are available from the authors upon request. These checks include using a ten-year window instead of a five-year window when measuring citation likelihood, using average rather than minimum citation likelihood when aggregating up to the patent level, using 5% and 15% cut-offs for RADICAL rather than 10%, using a 1% cut-off for BREAKTHROUGH rather than 5%, using purely historical aspiration measures, using interactions rather than split samples to test our moderating hypotheses (Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4), using count models rather than OLS for citations, excluding self-citations, dropping the 5% lowest performing firms to ensure our results are not driven by outliers, and using unadjusted performance measures in the second stage regression.
DISCUSSION
Our study sheds new light on the development of radical technologies within established firms. We show that firms' motivation to pursue such technologies is behaviorally driven, i.e., firms are most likely to pursue radical invention in existing technology domains when their performance in those domains is moderately below aspirations, and grow less likely to do so as performance either falls substantially below aspirations or rises substantially above aspirations. This tendency is accentuated in technologically diversified firms and firms whose overall technological performance is below aspirations. We also show that firms' ability to successfully develop radical technologies increases with their prior performance in a technology domain. Together, these findings point to a fundamental mismatch between motivation and ability in the pursuit of radical inventions within established firms, with firms overinvesting in radical invention when performance is moderately below aspirations as a result of problemdriven risk-seeking, and underinvesting in radical invention when performance is substantially above aspirations due to increased risk-aversion.
Our study contributes to behavioral theory (Argote & Greve, 2007; Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2012) in several ways. While prior studies in this tradition have generally focused on how performance relative to aspirations drives the extent and nature of firm search (Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Greve, 1998 Greve, , 2003 , we extend this work to consider not only firms' propensity to undertake more distant search, but also the success of these search efforts. By marrying a behavioral theory of motivation to a capability-based theory of ability (Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2000; Helfat, 2000; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003) , we show that the factors that drive firms to undertake more radical search in the first place also impact the success of that search, so that the behavioral tendency to search more aggressively when performance is below aspirations may cause firms to systematically overinvest in search under some conditions, while systematically underinvesting in others. Our empirical findings thus provide evidence that firms performing below aspirations may be susceptible to a failure trap (Levinthal & March, 1993) , being driven to overinvest in riskier, more radical inventions that are less likely to succeed; while firms performing substantially above aspirations may be susceptible to a success or competency trap (Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988) , underinvesting in radical inventions with a high potential for success on account of risk-aversion. Our study also contributes to behavioral theory by going beyond the effects of performance relative to aspirations at the overall firm level to examine the effects of performance by technology area. In doing so, we highlight how behavioral biases are exacerbated by the portfolio of options available to the firm (Arrfelt et al., 2013; Bardolet et al., 2011) , with these biases not only being stronger for multi-technology firms (Gambardella & Torrisi, 1998; Patel & Pavitt, 1997; Teece et al., 1994) , but the effect of lagging firm performance overall being different for high performing and low performing areas within the firm. Finally, our study also extends prior work by examining the effect of performance above and below aspirations on radical invention in particular (Dothan & Lavie, 2016) , instead of focusing on more general measures of R&D intensity or new product introduction (Chen & Miller, 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Greve, 1998 Greve, , 2003 .
In addition to advancing behavioral theory, our study also contributes to the literature on radical technologies, focusing on the role of established incumbents as a source of such technologies (Jiang et al., 2010; King & Tucci, 2002) . In particular, we emphasize the potential for radical technologies to be competence-enhancing (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Gatignon et al., 2002; Tushman & Anderson, 1986 ) building on and transforming firms' prior capabilities in a technology area rather than replacing them (Lavie, 2006; Taylor & Greve, 2006; Zhou & Li, 2012) , with firms being both more likely to pursue radical inventions in technology areas where they have prior experience, and more likely to develop successful radical technologies in areas where they have strong prior performance. Moreover, our use of a novel patent-based measure, that allows us to distinguish between the pursuit of radical technologies and their success (Ahuja et al., 2008; Denrell & Kovács, 2008; Eggers, 2012) , allows us to separate the drivers of a firm's motivation to pursue radical technologies from those of its ability to do so. Our study thus extends prior work that has made this distinction (Gilbert, 2005; Henderson, 1993) , by examining a substantially larger sample of firms, and by looking beyond the difference between incumbents and entrants to study the various drivers of radical invention within incumbents.
As with any study, our work has its limitations, many of which result from our choice to focus on patents as a measure of invention. While the use of patent-based measures allows us to test our theory in a systematic way across the entire range of inventive activity, it also introduces several limitations, most notably that we do not observe inventive effort that does not result in even a patent. At the same time, by focusing on patents, we are limiting ourselves to studying the technological success of a firm's inventions. There is certainly a substantial gap between the development of a successful (i.e., highly cited) patent, and the successful commercialization of a product or technology, with commercialization frequently requiring the combination of multiple patents, as well as a range of other complementary resources (Tripsas, 1997; Wu et al., 2014) . Technological success in the form of successful patenting is only weakly correlated with commercial success (Gambardella et al., 2008; Harhoff et al., 2003) , with incumbent firms often failing to commercialize the successful radical inventions they have developed, either because they fail to appreciate their potential (Benner, 2007 (Benner, , 2010 Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) or because successful commercialization is too disruptive to the firm's existing business (Adner, 2002; Christensen & Bower, 1996; Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006) . Future work could thus extend our findings by examining the effect of performance relative to aspirations on a firm's motivation and ability to commercialize successful radical inventions. Future work could also look at alternate measures of technological invention, such as scientific publications (e.g., Lavie & Drori, 2012; Nelson, 2009) . Finally, our work is also limited in that we have chosen to focus on radical invention by established firms in technology areas in which they are already active, and therefore do not examine what drives the development of radical technologies by non-corporate actors or what leads existing firms to pursue radical invention in completely new domains.
To conclude, we examine the role of established firms as a source of radical inventions, distinguishing between firms' motivation and ability to develop radical technologies. We argue and show that a firm's motivation to pursue radical technologies is highest when its performance is moderately below aspirations and falls as its performance either falls substantially below aspirations or rises substantially above aspirations, while its ability to successfully develop such technologies increases with its prior performance in a technology area. There is thus a mismatch between motivation and ability-firms overinvest in radical invention when performance is moderately below aspirations and underinvest in it when performance is substantially above aspirations-and this mismatch is greater for technologically diversified firms and those whose overall technological performance is below aspirations. Our study thus contributes to a behavioral understanding of firm invention, highlighting the role of incumbent firms in developing radical technologies, while distinguishing between their motivation and ability in doing so. 
